Skip to content

Repository navigation

Security: psyb0t/ibkr-httpapi

Security

docs/security.md

title Security
description What an ibkr-httpapi deployment can reach, what it stores, how the bearer token works, and what to set before it leaves localhost.
nav_order 10

Security

Anyone who can send requests to this API can trade the brokerage account the gateway is logged into. Treat the API token like the account password.

What the stack can do

  • Read balances, positions, orders and executions for every account on the IBKR login.
  • Place, cancel and exercise for real through POST /v1/orders, POST /v1/options/combo, POST /v1/options/exercise, DELETE /v1/orders/{orderId} and DELETE /v1/orders. The last one cancels every open order on the account, including orders placed in other tools.
  • Do all of the above through MCP at /mcp with the same token.

The only built-in brake is IBKR's own: READ_ONLY_API=yes in .env.ibkr makes the gateway refuse orders. A paper login (TRADING_MODE=paper) keeps real money out of reach.

Authentication

  • One shared bearer token, api_token in config.yaml or API_TOKEN in the environment. The middleware in ibkrapi/server.py checks it on every path: /v1/*, /mcp, /docs and /openapi.json. It compares with hmac.compare_digest.
  • An empty token turns auth off for everything, with one warning line from run.sh at startup.
  • There are no users, scopes or read-only tokens. Whoever has the token has full access.
  • Generate a long random token and keep config/config.yaml out of Git (it is gitignored):
openssl rand -hex 32

Network exposure

  • nginx publishes the API on 127.0.0.1:8889 by default (API_HOST_BIND, API_HOST_PORT). nginx itself speaks plain HTTP; there is no TLS in the stack.
  • The api container has no published port. The gateway's TWS socket is only on the internal backend network. VNC (5900) and port 8001 are published on 127.0.0.1 only.
  • wickworks sits on an internal: true network with no route out.
  • The MCP endpoint does not check the Host header (the SDK's DNS rebinding protection is turned off), so a browser page could reach a loopback API without a token if you run it without one. Always set a token, even on localhost.

Before you bind to anything but loopback:

  1. Set a strong api_token.
  2. Put TLS in front: the commented cloudflared service tunnels to http://nginx:80 without a host port, and the tailscale service puts it on a tailnet. Add an access layer of your own (Cloudflare Access, tailnet ACLs) in front of the token.
  3. Test the whole chain against a paper account from another network before you switch to live.
  4. Rotate the token after testing.

What is stored where

Data Location Notes
IBKR username and password .env.ibkr, passed only to the ibgateway container Gitignored. The API process never sees them.
API token config/config.yaml, and .env (written by run.sh) Both gitignored. The startup log records only whether a token is set and its length.
Gateway settings .data/ibgateway/
Request logs logs/full.log and container stdout Method, path, status, duration, client IP and user agent. No bodies, no tokens.
Market data and trading history data/history/ Executions and completed orders include account numbers, prices and quantities. Protect backups accordingly.

Container hardening

api, nginx and wickworks run read-only with all capabilities dropped and no-new-privileges; the api image runs as a non-root user with hash-checked dependencies. The gateway container cannot be locked down the same way. Details on the deployment page.

Supply chain

Python dependencies are hash-locked and pass a 7-day age gate before they can enter the lock, base images are pinned by digest, and make audit, make audit-go and make audit-compose scan the Python deps, the Go client and the compose files. See Development.

There aren't any published security advisories