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teams: align CISA checks with pinned baseline - #2788

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JeremyFinney-lgtm wants to merge 5 commits into
maester365:mainfrom
JeremyFinney-lgtm:feat/cisa-teams-baseline-alignment

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📑 Description

Aligns Maester's CISA Teams suite with the pinned ScubaGear Teams baseline. Adds 14 native checks and their remediation guides, updates the CISA framework mappings, and adds delegated Teams unified app settings retrieval with legacy-policy fallback where appropriate.

This branch was originally stacked on #2768. Per direction, this PR targets upstream main; since #2768's head branch exists only in the fork, the current comparison also includes the commits from #2768. The PR will need to be updated after #2768 lands to remove that overlap.

No linked issue.

✅ Checks

  • My pull request adheres to the code style of this project.
  • My code requires changes to the documentation.
  • I have updated the documentation as required.
  • The build and unit tests pass after running /powershell/tests/pester.ps1 locally.

ℹ️ Additional Information

Validation completed:

  • Build-MaesterModule.ps1 -OutputRoot C:\Users\MODAdministrator\source\repos\maester-cisa-teams-baseline-alignment\.tmp-maester-teams-build-b89b08e7f3444954895a8c1794c6729a — passed; temporary build output was removed.
  • Invoke-Pester -Path @('.\powershell\tests\functions\CisaTeamsChecks.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\functions\TeamsUnifiedSettings.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\functions\Clear-ModuleVariable.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\functions\Connect-Maester.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\functions\Disconnect-Maester.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\functions\engine\Frameworks.Tests.ps1', '.\powershell\tests\general\Build-MaesterModule.Tests.ps1') -Output Normal — passed (171 tests).
  • git diff --cached --check — passed.

The full /powershell/tests/pester.ps1 suite was not run. The repository template notes new checks submitted during the Maester 3.0 code freeze may be reviewed after release.


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🤖 This pull request was created with the assistance of Copilot (Copilot SDK in VS Code), directed by @JeremyFinney-lgtm.

JeremyFinney-lgtm and others added 5 commits November 10, 2026 15:36
Pin the CISA framework to ScubaGear 92e5f2e, add the Security Suite requirements, mark removed policies, move EXO 9.5 and 10.3 to SECURITYSUITE 1.1 and 1.2, add 1.3 and the 1.4 shim of ORCA.158, and remove the superseded EXO 9.1, 9.3, 10.1 and 10.2 tests.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add 14 CISA Teams checks and framework mappings, with unified app settings retrieval and lifecycle handling.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
@JeremyFinney-lgtm
JeremyFinney-lgtm requested review from a team as code owners November 10, 2026 22:59
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This pull request changes files that a website explainer describes:

  • How Maester works (website/public/explainers/how-it-works/) describes powershell/public/connect/Connect-Maester.ps1

If the change alters what the explainer shows (a gate, a reason code, a command, a count), update its composition and its chapters in website/src/data/explainers.json. If it doesn't, no action is needed.

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Attribute review

Checked 18 test(s) against the attribute rubric with claude-opus-5-5: 11 passed, 7 failed, 0 could not be reviewed.

Fail: CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.2

tests/cisa/exchange/Test.CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.2.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
ResourceType Tenant Tenant CISA.MS.EXO.10.3 has the same title and requirement (ZAP so mail can be reviewed after delivery), so the two must share ResourceType. This test evaluates the single effective anti-malware policy for all recipients, which the rubric rates Tenant. The related test CISA.MS.EXO.10.3 declares Policy and should be changed to Tenant in this pull request.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
ResourceType Tenant Policy The description says the test checks the Global meeting policy and every custom policy, and the remediation fixes each affected policy, so a failure points at specific meeting policies. The rubric says a test that evaluates every policy and lists the failing ones uses the policy type. CIS.M365.8.5.7 and MT.1048 check the same setting; if they also evaluate custom policies, change them to Policy in this pull request so the three stay aligned.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
Severity High Medium CIS.M365.8.5.2 and MT.1047 check the same setting (AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting) and both declare Medium, so the same check must carry the same severity. The rubric also gives Medium: the control limits exposure to one workload (Teams meetings) and is not the main control against a stolen-password attack.
Mitre T1078, T1078.001 None The rubric forbids listing a technique beside its own sub-technique. The description also does not explain how blocking anonymous meeting start stops Valid Accounts or Default Accounts abuse, since anonymous users hold no account, so None fits, as the matching CIS.M365.8.5.2 and MT.1047 tests use.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
ResourceType Tenant Policy The source says it 'Checks every Teams meeting policy, including the Global and custom policies', and the Markdown tells admins to fix the Global policy and each affected custom policy. The rubric says a test that evaluates every policy and lists the ones that fail uses the policy type, not Tenant. If CIS.M365.8.5.4 and MT.1042 also evaluate every meeting policy, change them to Policy in the same pull request. If they check only the Global policy, Tenant is right for them.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.1

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.1.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
Severity High Medium The test checks Teams federation, a single workload, and harm needs an external user to phish a recipient, so the rubric's Medium (one workload, defence-in-depth) fits rather than High. CIS.M365.8.2.1 is the same check (restrict external domains in Teams external access) and declares Medium; the same check must share Severity.
ImplementationCost Medium Low The Markdown fix is one organization-wide setting in the Teams admin center: select Allow only specific external domains and add approved domains. The rubric rates one setting in one portal as Low, and deciding which domains to allow is not counted. CIS.M365.8.2.1 is the same check with the same fix and declares Low.
Mitre T1199, T1204.001 T1566.003, T1204.001 The description names phishing through external Teams communication. That is spearphishing via a service (T1566.003) and malicious links (T1204.001). Restricting federation to approved domains does not prevent or detect abuse of a trusted third-party relationship (T1199), so the description does not support that technique.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
Severity High Medium This test checks the same setting as CIS.M365.8.2.3 (AllowTeamsConsumerInbound: external unmanaged Teams users cannot initiate conversations), which is Medium. The rubric requires the same check to carry the same Severity in both suites, and Medium is the value it gives here: the exposure is limited to one workload (Teams chat from unmanaged accounts), and phishing through it is a further channel behind other controls rather than a tenant-wide primary control. When two levels fit, the lower one is correct.

Fail: CISA.MS.TEAMS.4.1

tests/cisa/teams/Test.CISA.MS.TEAMS.4.1.ps1

Attribute Declared Expected Why
Severity High Medium This test returns the result of the CIS test and checks the same Global client setting, AllowEmailIntoChannel. That makes it the same check as CIS.M365.8.1.2, which is rated Medium, so Severity must match. Under the rubric, channel email is one workload and a defence-in-depth path for untrusted content, which fits Medium; a SHALL wording does not raise the value.

Pass

  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.3: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.4: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.1: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.4: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.6: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.7: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.3: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3: Product, RelatedProduct, Feature, Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact, ImplementationCost, Mitre

Notes

  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.3: RelatedProduct is not declared, while related tests of the same Safe Attachments setting (CIS.M365.2.1.4, ORCA.124) list 'exchange'. The fix is made in the Defender portal, so it is not required. Consider adding 'exchange' if Exchange admins would expect to find this test under it.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.3: Mitre: T1204.002 (Malicious File) is a plausible addition. Blocking or dynamically delivering attachments with unknown malware also stops users from opening the file. Related Safe Attachments tests list it. Its absence is not a finding.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.3: CIS.M365.2.1.4 checks the same setting: the highest-priority Safe Attachments policy and its action. Area, ResourceType and Severity match it. ORCA.124 is a different check: it evaluates every policy and uses ResourceType Policy, so no comparison is required.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.3: Severity High is defensible. Safe Attachments is the primary tenant-wide control against malicious attachments delivered by phishing.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.4: This test delegates to ORCA.158 and checks the same global setting as CIS.M365.2.1.5. Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact and ImplementationCost all match those tests (email-protection, Tenant, Medium, Low, Low), as the same-check rule requires.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.4: Severity Medium is defensible: Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams is a defence-in-depth layer behind the built-in virus scanning, and its reach is limited to files in those workloads.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.4: Mitre T1080 (Taint Shared Content) and T1204.002 (Malicious File) fit the description of malicious files shared through Teams, SharePoint and OneDrive.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.1: CISA.MS.EXO.9.5 checks the same requirement: at minimum .exe, .cmd and .vbe click-to-run attachments are blocked. Its Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact and ImplementationCost all match the declared values.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.1: ResourceType 'Tenant' is defensible. The test evaluates the single effective all-recipient anti-malware policy, which the rubric treats like the default or global policy of a kind.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.1: Product 'exchange' follows the tests/cisa/exchange folder. RelatedProduct 'defender' fits because the remediation is made in the Defender portal.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.2: Severity High matches CISA.MS.EXO.10.3 and is accepted. Zero-hour auto purge is arguably a second layer behind malware scanning at delivery, which the rubric would rate Medium. If you lower it, lower both tests together.
  • CISA.MS.SECURITYSUITE.1.2: Defender has a zero-hour-auto-purge feature, but exchange does not. anti-malware is consistent with the related Exchange tests and with the anti-malware policy setting the remediation targets.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1: Severity Medium, UserImpact Low, ImplementationCost Low and Area external-access match CIS.M365.8.5.7 and MT.1048, which check the same setting (AllowExternalParticipantGiveRequestControl).
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1: Mitre None is defensible because the Markdown names attacker behaviour only vaguely ('unauthorized actions'). CIS.M365.8.5.7 maps the same control to T1219; consider it if the description is expanded to explain the remote-control abuse.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1: Control lists 'nist-800-53-r5:AC-17a'. The rubric says a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy does not list NIST controls, because the framework file carries that mapping as Related. 'AC-17a' is also not in the base-control or enhancement form the pinned list uses. Consider removing it.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.1: The other CISA Teams meeting tests that use the same helper (CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2 to 1.7) are all declared Tenant. If the helper evaluates every policy, they likely need the same ResourceType review.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2: Area, ResourceType, UserImpact and ImplementationCost match the same checks CIS.M365.8.5.2 and MT.1047.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2: The test evaluates the Global policy and every custom meeting policy. Under the rubric, a test that lists the failing policies could use ResourceType 'Policy'. 'Tenant' is kept here for consistency with the matching tests. If this test reports individual failing policies, consider moving all three tests to 'Policy' together.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2: Control lists 'nist-800-53-r5:SC-15a'. The rubric says a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy does not list NIST controls, because the framework file carries them as Related. 'SC-15a' is also unlikely to be a valid pinned ID. Consider removing it.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3: No related test is the same combined check. CIS.M365.8.5.3, MT.1045, CIS.M365.8.5.4, MT.1042 and CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5 each cover only one half, or a stricter form, of the lobby settings. Area, ResourceType and Severity still match those tests, so the values are consistent.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3: UserImpact Low is defensible but borderline. The PowerShell fix sets AutoAdmittedUsers to EveryoneInCompany, which also holds guests and federated users in the lobby. CIS.M365.8.5.3 rates that same change Medium. Consider aligning the Markdown's PowerShell example with the 'any value other than Everyone' guidance in the portal steps.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3: Mitre None is acceptable because the Markdown names no attacker behaviour. If the description is expanded to cover uninvited or anonymous participants joining meetings, a technique may become warranted.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3: Outside this review: related test CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.2 lists T1078 together with its own sub-technique T1078.001, which the rubric does not allow.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.4: Control lists 'nist-800-53-r5:AC-3'. The rubric says a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy does not list NIST controls, because the framework file carries that mapping as Related. Consider removing it.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.4: CIS.M365.8.5.3 reads the same AutoAdmittedUsers setting and the same 'People in my org' fix, but it is not treated as the same check. CIS restricts lobby bypass to the organization. This test fails when internal users are not admitted automatically and passes 'EveryoneInSameAndFederatedCompany', so its intent and pass set differ. Its Severity (Medium) and UserImpact (Medium) are therefore not compared.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.4: Area 'external-access' matches the other lobby-bypass tests and is defensible. The description, however, is about admitting internal users, so 'access-control' would also fit. Consider adding a line to the Markdown explaining how the setting limits who outside the organization can bypass the lobby.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.4: Severity 'Low' is defensible because the Markdown frames the control as convenience for internal users. The exposure from anonymous lobby bypass is covered by CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.3.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5: Severity Medium, UserImpact Low and ImplementationCost Low match the same check in CIS.M365.8.5.4 and MT.1042. They also fit the rubric: lobby bypass is a defence-in-depth control for one workload, and the fix only makes dial-in callers wait in the lobby.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5: Area external-access fits: the control is about unauthenticated outside callers joining meetings.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5: Mitre None is defensible and matches the related same-check tests. The description names no specific ATT&CK technique.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.5: RelatedProduct is correctly omitted, because the fix is made only in the Teams admin center.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.6: CIS.M365.8.5.9 checks the same Global meeting policy recording setting, and this test returns its result. Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact and ImplementationCost all match it.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.6: Control lists 'nist-800-53-r5:CM-7'. The rubric says a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy does not list NIST controls, because the framework file carries CISA's mapping as Related. Consider removing it. Control is outside this review.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.6: Mitre 'None' is defensible because the description names no attacker behaviour. If the description is expanded to cover recordings being collected from shared repositories, consider T1213.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.7: No related test checks live event (broadcast) recording; CIS.M365.8.5.9 and CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.6 cover meeting recording, a different setting. Area data-protection and Severity Low are still consistent with them.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.1.7: UserImpact Low is defensible: moving from Always record to Organizer can record leaves organizers able to record, and end users notice little.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.1: UserImpact Medium matches CIS.M365.8.2.1 and is defensible: blocking all but approved domains stops some users' existing chats with external contacts.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.1: Data disclosure via Teams chat (exfiltration) is also mentioned in the Markdown; a technique such as T1567 could be considered, but its absence is not a finding.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2: UserImpact is not compared with CIS.M365.8.2.3. This test's Markdown also offers turning off unmanaged contact entirely, so the two fixes are not plainly the same. Medium is defensible because some users lose a capability, but Low would also fit if only inbound contact is turned off.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2: T1566 (or a Teams-relevant phishing sub-technique) could be considered alongside T1204.001, given the Markdown's mention of unwanted contact from unmanaged accounts.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2: The Markdown tells admins to edit the Global policy and each custom external access policy. The test reads only the tenant federation configuration and does not evaluate per-policy settings. Consider aligning the text or the check.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.3: CIS.M365.8.2.2 ('Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled') appears to be the same check, since both turn off AllowTeamsConsumer. Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact and ImplementationCost match it, so they are consistent.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.3: CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.2 is rated High but is a different check: it covers inbound contact initiated by unmanaged users. The Medium rating here is defensible, because outbound contact that internal users start is a narrower exposure.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.3: T1566 (Phishing) is a plausible extra technique, given that the Markdown names phishing. Its absence is not a finding.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.2.3: The test reads only the tenant federation configuration (AllowTeamsConsumer). The remediation, however, tells admins to edit the Global policy and each custom external access policy. Consider aligning the remediation text with the setting the test evaluates.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.4.1: Area, ResourceType, UserImpact and ImplementationCost match CIS.M365.8.1.2. Both tests recommend the same fix: turn off AllowEmailIntoChannel in the Global client configuration.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.4.1: Mitre T1204.001 and T1204.002 are plausible from the description, since untrusted email content with links and files can be delivered into channels. Mitre is not compared with the related test.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.4.1: Not part of this review: a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy should not list nist-800-53-r5 controls, because the framework file carries them as Related. 'nist-800-53-r5:SC-7(10)(a)' also does not look like a valid pinned control ID.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1: ResourceType Tenant fits the unified org-wide app setting. In the legacy fallback the test evaluates every app permission policy, which could argue for Policy. Tenant is defensible and matches CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2/5.3 and CIS.M365.8.4.1.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1: ImplementationCost Medium is defensible because the Markdown asks the admin to review individual Microsoft apps against an agency-approved set. It is consistent with CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2/5.3. If the approved set is already known, the change is a single setting and Low could also be argued.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1: Mitre T1195 is a loose fit for unapproved Teams apps reaching agency data. It is consistent with the sibling tests. T1528 is plausible if the description stressed apps gaining access to user data through consent.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2: Control lists 'nist-800-53-r5:CM-11'. The rubric says a test that implements a CISA SCuBA policy does not list NIST controls, because the framework file carries that mapping as Related. Consider removing it. Control is outside this review's scope, so this is not a finding.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2: T1528 is only loosely implied by the Markdown's 'access paths that the agency does not manage'. It is defensible and matches CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3. Consider stating in the description how an unapproved third-party app could obtain user tokens, so the mapping is visible to readers.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.2: ResourceType Tenant fits the unified org-wide app setting and matches CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1, CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3 and CIS.M365.8.4.1. All three related tests share the declared Area, ResourceType, Severity, UserImpact and ImplementationCost, so there is no cross-suite mismatch.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3: ResourceType Tenant is defensible because the test reads the unified org-wide app setting, and it matches CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1 and 5.2. The legacy fallback, however, evaluates every app permission policy. If that path lists the failing policies, Policy would fit better for those results.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3: Mitre T1528 is only loosely implied by the Markdown's 'access to organizational information'. Consider stating how a malicious custom app could obtain tokens or data, so the mapping is visible to readers. T1195 fits the 'unreviewed code' rationale.
  • CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.3: CIS.M365.8.4.1 covers app permission policies broadly and CISA.MS.TEAMS.5.1/5.2 cover other app types. None of them is the same check as this custom-app control, so no cross-suite alignment was required. The values agree with them anyway.

Change the value, or explain in the pull request why the declared value fits the rubric. A maintainer can overrule this check with the attribute-review-override label.

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