| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.2.x | ✅ |
| < 0.2 | ❌ |
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Instead, use the repository's private vulnerability reporting page:
https://github.com/lxfu1/memo-agent/security/advisories/new
Include:
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Any suggested fix (optional)
We will acknowledge your report within 48 hours and aim to release a fix within 7 days for critical issues.
memo-agent runs locally and connects to your configured LLM API. Key security considerations:
- Prompt injection — user-editable files (
NOTES.md,PROFILE.md, recipes) are scanned for injection patterns before being injected into the system prompt - Path traversal — file tools resolve canonical paths and restrict reads, writes, edits, listings, and searches to
cwdand the profile directory, including through symlinks - Dangerous commands —
RunCommandmaintains a blocklist of destructive shell commands that always require confirmation regardless of permission mode - API keys — never committed; loaded from
.envor environment variables only - Tool scope — tools can be disabled via
permissions.disabledToolsinconfig.yaml
- The agent has access to your filesystem within the working directory — review tool permissions carefully in
askmode before grantingallow_always - LLM outputs are inherently non-deterministic; the permission system is a safety net, not a guarantee