Update dependency joi to v17.13.6 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #601 · devopslibrary/adde

renovate · 2026-08-26T16:34:30Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
joi	`17.4.0` → `17.13.6`

joi has an uncaught RangeError on deeply nested input through recursive `link()` schemas

CVE-2026-48038 / GHSA-q7cg-457f-vx79

More information

Details

Impact

Denial of service via untrapped exception in services validating user-supplied JSON / object input with recursive link schemas.

The blast radius depends on how the application invokes joi:

Highest impact: validate() called without try/catch in a request handler would cause an unhandled exception, potentially crashing the process.
Lower impact: validateAsync() or validate() inside a try/catch, the validation fails, but the error type is RangeError rather than a structured ValidationError, complicating error handling.

Patches

Upgrade to version >= 18.2.1.

Workarounds

Try/catch the validation to avoid uncaught exceptions.

References

Pull request: fix: protect link recursion from max call stack hapijs/joi#3113

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

joi: Prototype pollution via a `proto` language key in custom messages

CVE-2026-84368 / GHSA-6w3j-5fw6-r9vr

More information

Details

Impact

An application that passes attacker-controlled data into joi's custom message configuration (messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }) or rule({ message })) lets the attacker write properties onto Object.prototype, where every object in the process then inherits them. A key named __proto__ was treated as a language name, and the code reused the object it found at that key, which resolves to the prototype rather than to a new own property; a key named constructor did the same to the Object function's statics. A consuming application that gates on the mere presence of a property (if (user.isAdmin)) can be made to take the wrong branch for every object it inspects.

This is not reachable from data that joi validates. Custom messages are schema-construction configuration, normally written by the application developer. Exploitation therefore requires an application that feeds untrusted input straight into schema construction.

Patches

Upgrade to version 18.2.5 or 17.13.6.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted input into messages(), message(), prefs({ messages }), Joi.extend({ messages }) or rule({ message }). Or validate that they don't contain any __proto__ or constructor property.

Severity

CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

joi: object().rename() with a template target can set the validated object's prototype

CVE-2026-84367 / GHSA-gg4h-3hg2-grpc

More information

Details

Impact

Applications are affected only if a schema renames keys with a regular-expression source and a Joi.expression() / Joi.x() target that interpolates the pattern's own match data, combined with { multiple: true }, for example .rename(/^x-(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#1}'), { multiple: true }). Because the target is rendered from the matched input key, an attacker who controls input keys can send x-__proto__ with an object value and make the rename target render as __proto__, which sets the prototype of the object joi returns instead of creating a key on it. The global Object.prototype is not modified, so the effect is confined to the object returned by that one validate() call.

Schemas using a static string rename target are not affected, and neither are schemas left on the default { multiple: false }.

Patches

Versions 17.13.5 and 18.2.4 have been released to address the issue.

Workarounds

Replace the template rename target with a static string target.
Keep the template but make the capture unable to produce __proto__, using a negative lookahead: .rename(/^x-(?!__proto__$)(.+)$/, Joi.x('{#1}'), { multiple: true })
Drop { multiple: true } from the rename, which stops the rename before the assignment.

Severity

CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

hapijs/joi (joi)

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joi has an uncaught RangeError on deeply nested input through recursive link() schemas

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

References

Severity

References

joi: Prototype pollution via a __proto__ language key in custom messages

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

joi: object().rename() with a template target can set the validated object's prototype

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

Release Notes

Configuration

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renovate Bot commented Aug 26, 2026 •

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joi has an uncaught RangeError on deeply nested input through recursive `link()` schemas

joi: Prototype pollution via a `proto` language key in custom messages