| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | ✅ |
Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Use GitHub's
Report a vulnerability (private security
advisory). Include the version from GET /health, the affected endpoint, the request that triggers it, and what an
attacker gains. Expect a first reply within a week.
This project is a local helper, not a hardened network service. Its intended deployment is a single Windows machine,
reachable at 127.0.0.1 by the same user. Anything that breaks that assumption is worth knowing about:
- No authentication by default. Unless
OCR_API_TOKENis set, every endpoint is open to anyone who can reach the port. - Weak authentication when enabled. The token is compared as a plain string (constant-time at the sequence level, but not a hardened scheme), there is no rate limiting, no lockout and no TLS.
- Server-side request forgery.
?url=makes the server fetch an arbitrary URL, includinghttp://localhost:…and cloud metadata addresses. Do not enable it for untrusted clients. - Resource exhaustion. Requests are buffered in memory up to 64 MB and OCR is CPU/NPU bound; concurrent uploads can exhaust memory or starve the recognizer. There is no queue limit, quota or per-client throttling.
- File writes. The service never writes request data to disk. Uploads, decoded bitmaps and results stay in memory, which also means a crash loses everything.
- Dependencies. Image decoding and OCR run through Windows components (
Windows.Media.Ocr,BitmapDecoder, Windows App SDK); the service trusts them to parse hostile images safely. - Package identity.
package/register.ps1registers a sparse package for the current user; the self-signed certificate frompackage/build-msix.ps1is a development artifact and must never be trusted outside your own machine. Treat the generated.pfxpassword as disposable.
- Leave the default binding at
127.0.0.1. - Set
OCR_API_TOKENif any other local account or process can reach the port. - Do not expose the port to the internet or to a LAN you do not control. If you must, put it behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS and enforces authentication and rate limits.
- Do not accept attacker-controlled
?url=values from untrusted clients.