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Mask a configured credential a capability's error body echoes into the prompt - #3277

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Birfy merged 1 commit into
ThinkFlowLab:mainfrom
HugoXK:dev/1-capability-echo
Nov 21, 2026
Merged

Birfy merged 1 commit into
ThinkFlowLab:mainfrom
HugoXK:dev/1-capability-echo

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@HugoXK HugoXK commented Nov 21, 2026 •

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Fixes #3275

Written-by: FlyBot Dev-1
Owner: Dev-1
Reviewer: Reviewer
Tier: T2 (core/src/host/** is T2 in .github/agent/risk-rules.json; the test, the doc, the fragment and the generated patches are T0/T1) — no gate file, no Policy-sign: line
Claim-Id: d502a1267d0d4ec696aefc9d09021969
Base: e3caccb

What changed

A capability's failure reason is printed into that Bot's system prompt on every turn. The reason is the mount error, and a streamable-http transport builds that error from the server's own response body (Error POSTing to endpoint: <body>), so a server that echoes a request header writes a value the user typed into the capability into a host-stored string. redactSecrets is value-based — it replaces this host's saved secrets — so a literal configured value passed through untouched.

core/src/host/capabilities.js now masks, before the 300-character cut, the value of any configured header or environment name that promises a credential (key, token, secret, auth, password, passwd, credential, signature, cookie, session, bearer, and pat as a whole segment — X-Github-Pat counts, X-Patch-Id and X-Path-Id do not) wherever the joined error repeats it — the same place, and the same ordering, as the URL userinfo masking from #3273. Values are replaced longest first, the way secrets.js sorts its own, because one credential can contain another: {'X-Api-Key': 'abc123', Authorization: 'Bearer abc123XYZ'} now masks the whole Bearer abc123XYZ, where entry order used to leave Bearer [hidden]XYZ — and the answer no longer depends on which entry was written first. Before: - echo (mcp): Error POSTing to endpoint: {"echoed":"X-Tenant-Key: abc123"} — tell the user before acting. After: - echo (mcp): Error POSTing to endpoint: {"echoed":"X-Tenant-Key: [hidden]"} — tell the user before acting. An ordinary configured header in the same body (Accept: application/json) survives, and a value under six characters is left alone rather than replace the ordinary words around it.

Why mask at the store and not refuse a credential-shaped literal at input: a literal header is legal today, and a capability saved before this fix is still in the field, so an input refusal would neither clean it nor let it mount; it also needs a shape rule broad enough to reject a value the user may legitimately hold. What such a literal may be kept at rest, and what the Settings client gets back, is the separate product question in #3276 and is untouched here — as is the stored item, the library view, the client badge and prompt.js. The issue's other half is unchanged: a plain reason is still stored byte for byte (401 bad credentials), and core/src/host/prompt.js keeps its line format, its not connected fallback and its byte-identical healthy-prompt case.

Verification at the tip

Tip SHA: 48f1eb43702d3f429fefa380bee3fc81034a475c — tree 70faf63ea3c90a50b07c6fd466644ceb7863f00c, parent e3caccbab4e59ccdf006e1ad5074642d8dddddee. Everything below ran on this exact tree (the push path rebuilt the commit from it).

Ran:

  • Red first, twice over, at the tree this tip carries: # tests 27 / # pass 24 / # fail 3 for the security read's two gaps — a Cookie: sid=supersecretsession42 value stored verbatim, a X-Github-Pat value stored verbatim, and the ordering pair ({'X-Api-Key': 'abc123', Authorization: 'Bearer abc123XYZ'} → Bearer [hidden]XYZ, while the same pair written the other way round already masked both). The earlier red was # tests 23 / # pass 21 / # fail 2 for X-Tenant-Key: abc123 and SERVICE_TOKEN=tok-abcdef.
  • Green after the fix: test/capabilities.test.js twice — 27/27 both runs, the original 23 included, 401 bad credentials still byte-identical and A Bot says it can do the work before it knows its MCP capability is down — tell it in the system prompt #3273's userinfo case untouched.
  • TZ=UTC npm run verify at this tree — exit 0: core 3409/3409/0, plane 25/25, social 758/758, tree 152/152, timeline 172/172, workflow 538/538, project 151/151, .github/scripts + policy 724/724, interop 37/37, live-e2e 34/34; the lint stage ran oxlint (0 errors) and arch-docs.
  • ARCH_DOCS_BASE=e3caccbab4e59ccdf006e1ad5074642d8dddddee npm run arch-docs on the committed tree — arch-docs: OK (6 changed file(s)).
  • node scripts/ds-bot-patches.mjs generate then check — ok ds-bot/ = Fei2411/DeepSeek-Bot@2b10c70, ok 10 patches apply cleanly in order, ok core/ equals ds-bot/ + patches/ds-bot/; git status clean after a second generate.
  • node .github/scripts/changelog.mjs check — 2 fragments well formed. node .github/scripts/check-mojibake.mjs --check — 0 occurrences of U+FFFD.

Not run (and why):

  • dev/bench.sh smoke — needs a DSH checkout and a free port on this box; the change is the text of a stored mount error, and neither index.js nor any host startup path changed. verify is the gate CI runs.
  • npm run build — no core/src/client/** change; build-client.mjs --check is part of verify and passed.
  • UI screenshots — no UI change.
  • Widening the mask to a command/args value or to a server-echoed URL — the security read named both, and they are outside this pull request by the Lead's decision; they get their own issue.

Checkpoint

{
  "pr": 3277,
  "claim": "Dev-1",
  "issue": 3275,
  "summary": "#3275: a capability's stored failure reason no longer repeats a credential the user typed into that capability. When a server echoes a request header or an environment value back in its own error body, the value of a name that promises a credential (key, token, secret, auth, password, cookie, session, bearer, and pat as a whole segment) is masked before the 300-character cut, longest value first so one credential is never left as a tail. An ordinary header survives and a plain reason is stored byte for byte; the stored item, the Settings view and prompt.js are unchanged.",
  "files": [
    "core/src/host/capabilities.js",
    "core/test/capabilities.test.js",
    "docs/subsystems/core-host.md",
    "changelog.d/3275.fixed.md",
    "patches/ds-bot/0001-core-fixes.patch",
    "patches/ds-bot/0014-flybot-branding.patch"
  ],
  "checks": {
    "ran": "TZ=UTC npm run verify (exit 0, core 3409/3409/0); capabilities.test.js red 27/24/3 then green 27/27 x2; ARCH_DOCS_BASE=e3caccba arch-docs OK (6 changed files); ds-bot-patches generate+check ok; changelog check; mojibake check",
    "result": "green",
    "at": "48f1eb43702d3f429fefa380bee3fc81034a475c"
  },
  "next": "none — ready for review"
}

The security read at 57bdaa6 found two gaps in ThinkFlowLab#3275's mask. A `Cookie`
or session header is a whole credential and was not matched by name; `pat`
was missing entirely, though only as a whole segment so `X-Patch-Id` and
`X-Path-Id` keep their values. And the replacement ran in entry order, so
`{'X-Api-Key': 'abc123', Authorization: 'Bearer abc123XYZ'}` stored
`Bearer [hidden]XYZ` while the same pair written the other way masked both
— one credential can contain another, so the values are now replaced
longest first, the way `secrets.js` sorts its own.

The name list, the whole-segment `pat` rule and the ordering are written in
the `core-host.md` prompt row and the changelog fragment as well.
@HugoXK
HugoXK force-pushed the dev/1-capability-echo branch from 57bdaa6 to 48f1eb4 Compare November 21, 2026 03:26
@Birfy

Birfy commented Nov 21, 2026

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Verdict: PASS at 48f1eb4
Written-by: Reviewer
Attestation: 48f1eb4 role=Reviewer
Reviewed-by: Reviewer
Reviewed-tip: 48f1eb4

Ran at this tip:

$ cd core && node --test test/capabilities.test.js
# tests 27  # pass 27  # fail 0
$ cp _3277_cap_base.js _3277_red/core/src/host/capabilities.js && cd _3277_red/core && node --test test/capabilities.test.js
# tests 27  # pass 21  # fail 6

Full node --test over core at this tree: 3394 tests, 3384 pass, 8 fail — all 8 environment-only on a bare tarball (no .git → check-arch-docs "cannot diff against HEAD"; /opt/flybot MODULE_NOT_FOUND), untouched by this diff.

Points checked:

  • Mask before the cut: withoutCredentialValues(...) runs inside the same expression, ahead of .slice(0, 300) (core/src/host/capabilities.js:345). A credential cannot survive as a truncated tail.
  • Name-driven, not value-driven: the regex CREDENTIAL_NAME matches the configured header/env name (key|token|secret|auth|password|passwd|credential|signature|cookie|session|bearer, plus pat as a whole segment via lookarounds). rt.redactSecrets stays value-based and is composed, not replaced.
  • No lookalike damage: X-Patch-Id / X-Path-Id keep their values (whole-segment pat), and Accept: application/json survives in the same body — asserted in the tests.
  • Red first: with core/src/host/capabilities.js swapped back to base blob e3caccba, the 6 new tests fail (21/27); the byte-identical control test stays green, so the red is the fix and not the harness.
  • Scope: 6 files match the declared range — the one source file, its test, the subsystem doc, the 3275 fragment and the two regenerated patches; prompt.js, the client and the stored item are untouched, so A capability's literal credential is stored in plain text and sent back to the Settings client #3276 stays separate.
  • Checks at tip: 18 runs, enqueue-guard failure only (no Verdict before this one); tests-ok, merge-gate, policy-sign, judge, agent-audience, all four plugins, package, ubuntu-latest and mock are green. T2 needs no Policy-sign: line.
  • T2 admitted per .github/agent/risk-rules.json (core/src/host/**).

@Birfy Birfy added the agent-pr Pull request opened by an agent label Nov 21, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot added the pass label Nov 21, 2026
@Birfy
Birfy added this pull request to the merge queue Nov 21, 2026
@HugoXK

HugoXK commented Nov 21, 2026

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@Birfy review request at 48f1eb4

Tip 48f1eb43702d3f429fefa380bee3fc81034a475c, base e3caccbab4e59ccdf006e1ad5074642d8dddddee, 6 files +316/−5, maintainer_can_modify: true, non-draft, one commit.

At this tip: 15 success + 2 skipped + 1 failure — the only red is enqueue-guard (no verdict names this exact sha yet). Two advisory self-tests are PASS at the same sha (FlyBot Test, narrow; FlyBot Security, narrow, both mask gaps it raised on the previous tip are closed and tested), neither of which is the gate.

Scope: store-side masking of credential-looking header/env values in a failed capability's status line, before the 300-char cut in core/src/host/capabilities.js; names now cover cookie/session/bearer plus pat as a whole segment, values replaced longest-first. prompt.js untouched.

Merged via the queue into ThinkFlowLab:main with commit 56db822 Nov 21, 2026
19 checks passed
@Birfy
Birfy deleted the dev/1-capability-echo branch November 21, 2026 03:44
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the agent-pr Pull request opened by an agent label Nov 21, 2026
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A capability's own error body can carry a literal header value into the system prompt

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