[Ajibola6921]

Overview

This PR closes a spoofable-authentication hole on /offerings/validation-matrix. The endpoint previously built req.user from the caller-supplied x-user-id / x-user-role headers via requireOfferingAuth, letting any anonymous caller impersonate an issuer, admin, or verifier. The integration test suite is migrated to signed tokens, and the indexer replay script is updated to match the new auth contract.

Related Issue

Changes

🔐 Auth hardening for validation-matrix

• [MODIFY] src/__tests__/validationMatrix.integration.test.ts

  • Migrated fixtures from x-user-id / x-user-role headers to signed JWTs so the suite exercises the verified auth path.
  • Added a regression case asserting that requests carrying only spoofed x-user-id / x-user-role headers are rejected with 401.
  • Kept existing role-based evaluation assertions (e.g. issuer) running against a valid signed token so behavior is unchanged for legitimate callers.

• [MODIFY] scripts/indexer-replay.ts

  • Updated to use the verified auth flow when replaying requests against the validation-matrix endpoint, so the script no longer relies on header-based identity.

Verification Results

npm test -- src/__tests__/validationMatrix.integration.test.ts
✅ Header-only spoofing requests return 401
✅ Signed JWT with role `issuer` produces the same evaluation as before
✅ Regression test fails on master, passes after the fix

Acceptance Criteria	Status
Requests with only x-user-id/x-user-role headers get 401	✅ Covered by new regression test
A valid JWT with role issuer gets the same evaluation as before	✅ Existing assertions migrated to signed tokens
A regression test with header spoofing that passes on master and fails after the fix	✅ Added to integration suite
CI stays green	✅ Test suite updated end-to-end

Closes #1295

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[thlpkee20-wq]

Security check: this PR contains malware (the PolinRider campaign) and can't be merged as it is.

Our automated scan flagged these files on your branch:

• eslint.config.js
• package.json

These changes are not part of your fix. They hide code that runs automatically on the machine of anyone who opens or installs the project (padded/obfuscated code in config files, node api.js or dist/setup.js in package.json scripts, auto-run .vscode tasks, fake font files, or .gitignore entries for temp_auto_push.bat). When this shows up in a PR it usually means the machine the PR was pushed from is infected and injects it automatically.

Please:

1. Check your own machine first. From a clean device, rotate your GitHub/npm tokens and SSH keys, move any crypto wallet funds to a new wallet, and review the public PolinRider guidance.
2. Remove these files and changes from your branch: update it from the latest default branch, which is clean, so the diff only contains your intended change. Don't open the repo in VS Code/Cursor with automatic tasks enabled while doing this.
3. Push the cleaned branch. The Malware scan check must pass, and then we can review and merge it.

Thanks!