The latest tagged release. rgit has no long-lived release branches, so a fix ships in the next tag rather than being backported.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository: https://github.com/Rethunk-Tech/rethunk-git-cli/security/advisories/new, or the Security tab, then Report a vulnerability. The report stays private between you and us until a fix ships.

If private reporting is unavailable, email oss@rethunk.tech with [SECURITY] in the subject.

Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a suspected vulnerability.

A useful report has the affected repository and version (or commit), steps to reproduce, what an attacker gets and under which conditions, and whether anyone else knows.

A vulnerability is a flaw that lets someone cross a boundary they should not: run code, read or change data they have no right to, escape a sandbox or path restriction, or leak a credential. A bug is anything else that misbehaves, such as a crash on your own input, wrong output or a slow path; open an ordinary issue for those. If you are unsure which one you have, report it privately and we will say.

We handle the report inside the private advisory, so you see each status change and can comment on the fix. The advisory goes public when the fix ships, or 90 days after your report, whichever comes first. If a fix is close, either of us can ask for more time in the thread. You are credited in the advisory unless you would rather not be.

• We acknowledge your report within 3 business days.
• We give you an assessment (accepted, needs more information or declined, with reasons) within 10 business days.
• We aim to ship a fix within 90 days of the report.

rgit stages and commits on a caller's behalf, so the interesting failures are ones where it writes something the caller did not name:

• A symbol anchor that stages bytes outside its own extent, or a path outside the repository.
• A crafted source file that makes the resolver stage content from an unrelated declaration.
• Anything that causes rgit to run a command the caller did not ask for, beyond the git invocations it documents.

• Hooks running arbitrary code. rgit runs git's hooks exactly as git commit does, and deliberately does not police them (docs/USAGE.md). A malicious hook in a repository you have already checked out is outside this boundary, as it is for git itself.
• Language servers and the tree-sitter CLI. Both are optional external programs you install; rgit shells out to them and trusts them the way any editor does. That trust does not extend to the path rgit reaches gopls's daemon socket at: a predictable name in a world-writable temp directory could be pre-created by another user on a multi-user host. So before every dial or spawn rgit creates or re-verifies a private, UID-scoped, 0700 subdirectory, Lstats it to reject a planted symlink rather than follow it, and confirms the current user still owns it; any check failing degrades to [ts-only] (internal/lsp/dial.go's privateSocketDir). Windows has no UID to scope by (os.Getuid returns -1, naming the directory rgit--1) and needs no ownership check: its per-user temp directory is already ACL-restricted by the platform. A caller-supplied $RGIT_LSP_SOCKET is exempt: it is the caller's path to manage, not one rgit vouches for.
• A wrong extent that stages too little. That is a correctness bug; please file it as an ordinary issue.

We will not pursue legal action against good-faith research that avoids privacy violations, data destruction and disruption of services, stops at a proof of concept, and keeps the details private until the advisory is published. Rethunk.Tech, LLC maintains this repository.