ci(release): add advisory scanning, SBOM, and signed release artifacts - #48
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`cargo deny check` now gates every push, every pull request (ci.yml), and every tagged release (release.yml, before build) against deny.toml's advisory, license, and source policy. Seven RUSTSEC advisories already inherited through acton-ai's exact pin (via libsql) are recorded there with reasons and tracked in #47; anything else fails the check. Each release archive now carries a sbom/ directory with a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM per binary it ships, generated per target so cross-platform-only dependencies don't leak into a platform that never builds them. The publish job signs SHA256SUMS keylessly with cosign, against the workflow's own GitHub Actions OIDC identity rather than a stored key. The verification command is in the release notes and in packaging/README.md. docs/supply-chain-policy.md is the written policy #43 asked for: the acton-ai pin rationale, the dependency-review process, what the advisory scan enforces and what it currently ignores and why, and how a new advisory gets triaged. Closes #43
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Closes #43.
What
cargo deny check(deny.toml) gates every push, every PR (ci.ymljob
advisories), and every tagged release (release.ymljobsupply-chain, beforebuild). A crate landing on RUSTSEC with nomatching
deny.tomlentry fails both.acton-ai's exact pin (vialibsql) are recorded indeny.tomlwith reasons, tracked in Bump acton-ai past 0.35.0 to clear inherited RUSTSEC advisories #47.sbom/directory: one CycloneDX 1.5 SBOMper binary it ships, generated per target with
cargo-cyclonedx.publishjob signsSHA256SUMSkeylessly withcosign(
id-token: write, no stored key), and shipsSHA256SUMS.sig/SHA256SUMS.pemwith the release. The verification command is in therelease notes and
packaging/README.md.docs/supply-chain-policy.mdis the written policy: the pin rationale,the dependency-review process, what the scan enforces vs. currently
ignores and why, and how a new advisory gets triaged.
Verification
cargo deny --locked checkpasses clean locally (advisories, bans,licenses, sources all
ok).ignoreentry fromdeny.tomlmakes
cargo deny check advisoriesfail (exit 1) — the mechanism behindthe "known-vulnerable crate fails CI" acceptance criterion.
clippy/test delta.
advisoriesjob for real.