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Roll out immutable action pins and least-privilege permissions before blocking security audits #223
Complete the consumer security-policy rollout remaining from #187. The shared actionlint/zizmor gate is available; report mode remains the default. Adding audit coverage does not establish that consumer repositories have a clean baseline.
Work
Inventory current findings and mutable third-party action references in each adopting repository; do not reuse historical counts as current evidence.
Pin third-party actions to full commit SHAs with version comments and configure Dependabot's github-actions updates.
Establish read-only workflow defaults and grant required write permissions per job, preserving release and deployment behavior.
Resolve or narrowly justify findings in each repository before enabling blocking security audits there.
Track adoption and acceptance through the consuming repositories' own issues and reviewed changes; coordinate any bootstrap propagation separately.
Acceptance
Each adopting repository has an explicit disposition for its audited findings, immutable third-party action references, least-privilege permissions, and passing ordinary build/release checks. Blocking enforcement is enabled only after that repository's verified baseline is clean or narrowly justified. Do not infer rollout completion from a shared workflow change alone.
Status
State: Paused — Inventory step posted as a comment (2026-11-21). Rollout (pinning, dependabot, permissions) not started; awaits L0 decision. Branch: l189/3241-guard-mail Scope: Inventory step only (read-only per-repo findings, one comment), per L0 task 1343. No rollout PRs. Plan: Collect current zizmor findings, unpinned third-party action refs, missing top-level permissions, workflow-lint adoption and dependabot github-actions coverage per consumer repo (excluding Direct, Screenplay.CritterStack, Chronicle.Wolverine, Chronicle.Dapr); post as one comment. Delivered: Nothing yet. Remaining: To be confirmed. Follow-ups: None.
Inventory: current findings per repository (2026-11-21)
This is the inventory step from the checklist, based on the workflow files on each repository's default branch today. It uses no historical counts. It was produced with zizmor 1.32.0 (offline, default persona) and a scan of uses: references. No repository was changed.
Scope: 70 non-archived, non-fork Cratis repositories. Direct, Screenplay.CritterStack, Chronicle.Wolverine and Chronicle.Dapr are left out for now; their owners are mid-change. Public repositories are listed below. The 10 private repositories are summarized as one aggregate line.
Headlines
No repository except Chronicle.Python configures Dependabot github-actions updates. All the others have no .github/dependabot.yml.
Only Chronicle, Stage and Arc call the shared workflow-lint.yml gate among the public repositories (Workflows runs its own).
unpinned-uses is by far the largest finding class. Pinning the shared callee workflows in this repository and the common actions/* steps in consumers removes most of it. Then come artipacked (actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false), excessive-permissions and template-injection.
Most repositories have at least one workflow without a top-level permissions: block. The same 2 of 4 pattern repeats across small repositories, which points at the bootstrapped wrapper workflows. If that holds, fixing the generator covers many repositories at once.
Most common zizmor audits (total findings across all scanned repositories)
"Unpinned refs" counts the distinct non-Cratis uses: references whose ref is not a full 40-character commit SHA.
Repository
Workflows
zizmor high/medium/low/info
Unpinned refs
No top-level permissions
workflow-lint
Dependabot actions
Chronicle
42
270/84/36/21
26
16 of 42
yes
no file
cli
11
34/22/1/10
4
3 of 11
no
no file
Ante
8
39/13/0/4
9
2 of 8
no
no file
Screenplay
14
19/31/12/8
5
4 of 14
no
no file
Documentation
2
47/1/0/0
8
1 of 2
no
no file
Scene
7
34/13/1/4
9
3 of 7
no
no file
Choreography
11
31/12/3/7
7
4 of 11
no
no file
Stage
9
24/18/1/5
6
3 of 9
yes
no file
Stage.Axon
6
30/9/1/1
7
2 of 6
no
no file
Templates
4
27/12/2/8
7
1 of 4
no
no file
Arc
16
34/4/9/8
4
3 of 16
yes
no file
Chronicle.TypeScript
9
26/10/1/2
4
3 of 9
no
no file
Chronicle.Mcp
6
26/10/0/1
7
3 of 6
no
no file
Lens
6
25/9/0/2
7
3 of 6
no
no file
Chronicle.Kotlin
9
21/9/0/2
5
3 of 9
no
no file
Arc.Elixir
7
26/4/7/2
5
2 of 7
no
no file
Fundamentals
10
18/12/3/6
5
4 of 10
no
no file
Eventmodelers-Build-Kit-Kotlin
5
14/15/1/0
3
3 of 5
no
no file
Eventmodelers-Build-Kit-Java
5
14/15/1/0
3
3 of 5
no
no file
Cast
7
21/8/1/2
5
2 of 7
no
no file
Montage
6
21/8/0/1
9
2 of 6
no
no file
Eventmodelers-Build-Kit-CSharp
6
14/15/1/0
3
3 of 6
no
no file
Chronicle.Elixir
8
20/8/0/2
3
2 of 8
no
no file
AuthProxy
13
17/11/9/8
5
6 of 13
no
no file
Architecture
6
19/7/0/4
4
2 of 6
no
no file
.github
7
16/7/0/0
3
4 of 7
no
no file
Narrator
6
15/7/0/2
3
3 of 6
no
no file
Prologue
6
16/5/0/3
8
3 of 6
no
no file
Screenplay.Generation
6
14/7/0/5
3
3 of 6
no
no file
Dockerfiles
5
10/8/0/0
0
0 of 5
no
no file
Samples
8
4/13/0/0
0
3 of 8
no
no file
Prompter
12
3/13/0/1
0
3 of 12
no
no file
Grip
9
8/8/0/0
3
2 of 9
no
no file
Arc.Kotlin
11
3/13/1/0
0
2 of 11
no
no file
Synopsis
6
10/4/2/5
3
3 of 6
no
no file
Chronicle.Python
5
11/3/3/0
6
1 of 5
no
yes
blog.cratis.io
6
9/4/0/0
4
2 of 6
no
no file
Showrunner
7
4/7/2/0
0
2 of 7
no
no file
Specifications
7
5/6/0/3
1
3 of 7
no
no file
Fundamentals.Kotlin
6
3/7/0/0
0
2 of 6
no
no file
cratis.studio
4
6/4/0/0
2
2 of 4
no
no file
AI
4
0/8/0/11
0
0 of 4
no
no file
Components
9
4/4/6/1
0
2 of 9
no
no file
release-action
4
5/2/3/0
2
1 of 4
no
no file
cratis.no
6
4/3/0/0
0
2 of 6
no
no file
Automation
3
3/4/0/0
0
3 of 3
no
no file
Workflows
35
2/4/16/0
0
4 of 35
n/a
no file
DirectDocumentation
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
homebrew-cratis
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
cratis.direct
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
docs.cratis.studio
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
DirectPublic
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
Common
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
Workshops
4
3/3/0/0
0
2 of 4
no
no file
Arc.TypeScript
4
3/2/1/2
0
0 of 4
no
no file
Chronicle.Go
8
2/0/4/2
0
0 of 8
no
no file
Fundamentals.Go
7
2/0/4/0
0
0 of 7
no
no file
Arc.Go
9
2/0/4/2
0
0 of 9
no
no file
StudioIssues
1
1/1/0/0
0
1 of 1
no
no file
AI.Distribution
1
0/0/0/0
0
0 of 1
no
no file
10 private repositories (aggregate)
89
192 high / 79 medium
24
13 of 89
1 of 10
0 of 10
Suggested order for the rollout (not started; no pull requests were opened as part of this step)
Pin the third-party actions inside this repository's reusable workflows and in the bootstrapped wrapper templates. That one change reaches most consumers at once.
Add a github-actions Dependabot ecosystem through the bootstrap, so the pins stay current.
Then work per repository from the top of the table down: pin the repository's own steps, add top-level permissions: {} or contents: read, and set persist-credentials: false on checkouts.
Triage template-injection and dangerous-triggers findings individually before any blocking mode is enabled. They need judgment, not a mechanical fix.
Part 1 is up for review in #257. Every third-party action in this repository's workflows, composite actions and bootstrapped wrapper payloads was already pinned to a full commit SHA matching its tag, so no consumer repository receives a change. #257 adds monthly, grouped Dependabot updates for this repository only, and a check that fails CI if a third-party action is referenced by a mutable tag or branch. Organization-wide Dependabot and the per-repository pinning and permissions work in the inventory above are not started.
Template-injection and dangerous-trigger triage (read-only) is done across the organization's repositories, using source review plus an offline zizmor audit.
No finding is exploitable by an outside contributor. A few hardening items were identified, each reachable only by people who can already push to the repository:
pull_request_target workflows that build the pull-request head with publishing rights, guarded by a same-repository check (Chronicle, Choreography, Fundamentals).
An expression interpolated directly into a shell script in Scene's dotnet-build.yml.
A pull-request job in Templates with broader write permissions than it appears to need.
Follow-up fixes, if any, will be small, separate changes per repository.
The same-repository guards on the remaining pull_request_target workflows stay as they are by design. Remaining scope for this issue: per-repository adoption of the shared workflow lint and organization-wide Dependabot for GitHub Actions, both deferred.
Workflow-lint adoption rollout status: .github/workflows/workflow-lint.yml (the reusable actionlint/zizmor caller) has been added through one small no-release pull request per repository.
Merged: 61 repositories. Each merged after its checks, including the new lint job, passed. Two needed small fixes in the same pull request:
Cratis/AI: workflow-lint.yml added to the allowed-workflows list in the repository verification.
Cratis/Chronicle.Mcp: actions/cache moved from v3 to v4 in publish.yml, which the linter rejected.
Merged with known, unrelated failures: Cratis/Samples (its main build has failed since 2026-10-29 on a NU1109 Chronicle package downgrade) and Cratis/Strategy (the validate check also fails on main-line branches over slide provenance claims). Both failures need their own fixes.
Not adopted, Cratis/AI.Distribution: its generated-distribution verification locks the control-plane workflow inventory, and CI validates against the previous revision. Adding a workflow there needs a staged policy change first, so the pull request was closed.
Blocked, Lint workflow changes with the shared Cratis workflow lint Chronicle.Python#56: branch protection requires a check named policy / verify, but the workflow reports verify / verify. This mismatch was already there and blocks every pull request in that repository. It needs a protection or workflow fix by the owner.
Not yet done: Cratis/Documentation (has an active work lane), Cratis/Direct and Cratis/Infrastructure (left out of this rollout on purpose).
Activity
woksin commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Inventory: current findings per repository (2026-11-21)
This is the inventory step from the checklist, based on the workflow files on each repository's default branch today. It uses no historical counts. It was produced with zizmor 1.32.0 (offline, default persona) and a scan of
uses:references. No repository was changed.Scope: 70 non-archived, non-fork Cratis repositories. Direct, Screenplay.CritterStack, Chronicle.Wolverine and Chronicle.Dapr are left out for now; their owners are mid-change. Public repositories are listed below. The 10 private repositories are summarized as one aggregate line.
Headlines
github-actionsupdates. All the others have no.github/dependabot.yml.workflow-lint.ymlgate among the public repositories (Workflows runs its own).unpinned-usesis by far the largest finding class. Pinning the shared callee workflows in this repository and the commonactions/*steps in consumers removes most of it. Then comeartipacked(actions/checkoutwithoutpersist-credentials: false),excessive-permissionsandtemplate-injection.permissions:block. The same 2 of 4 pattern repeats across small repositories, which points at the bootstrapped wrapper workflows. If that holds, fixing the generator covers many repositories at once.Most common zizmor audits (total findings across all scanned repositories)
unpinned-uses1346 ·artipacked419 ·excessive-permissions314 ·template-injection238 ·self-repository136 ·secrets-inherit67 ·adhoc-packages29 ·unsound-ternary20 ·dangerous-triggers15 ·use-trusted-publishing6 ·cache-poisoning4 ·dependabot-cooldown2Most common unpinned third-party actions (number of repositories)
actions/checkout37 ·actions/setup-node23 ·actions/setup-dotnet18 ·NuGet/login17 ·actions/upload-artifact11 ·docker/login-action11 ·actions/cache11 ·docker/setup-buildx-action11 ·DavidAnson/markdownlint-cli2-action10 ·actions/download-artifact9 ·docker/build-push-action9 ·actions/setup-java8Per repository
"Unpinned refs" counts the distinct non-Cratis
uses:references whose ref is not a full 40-character commit SHA.Suggested order for the rollout (not started; no pull requests were opened as part of this step)
github-actionsDependabot ecosystem through the bootstrap, so the pins stay current.permissions: {}orcontents: read, and setpersist-credentials: falseon checkouts.template-injectionanddangerous-triggersfindings individually before any blocking mode is enabled. They need judgment, not a mechanical fix.woksin commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Part 1 is up for review in #257. Every third-party action in this repository's workflows, composite actions and bootstrapped wrapper payloads was already pinned to a full commit SHA matching its tag, so no consumer repository receives a change. #257 adds monthly, grouped Dependabot updates for this repository only, and a check that fails CI if a third-party action is referenced by a mutable tag or branch. Organization-wide Dependabot and the per-repository pinning and permissions work in the inventory above are not started.
woksin commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Template-injection and dangerous-trigger triage (read-only) is done across the organization's repositories, using source review plus an offline
zizmoraudit.No finding is exploitable by an outside contributor. A few hardening items were identified, each reachable only by people who can already push to the repository:
pull_request_targetworkflows that build the pull-request head with publishing rights, guarded by a same-repository check (Chronicle, Choreography, Fundamentals).dotnet-build.yml.Follow-up fixes, if any, will be small, separate changes per repository.
woksin commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Hardening from the triage is merged:
The same-repository guards on the remaining
pull_request_targetworkflows stay as they are by design. Remaining scope for this issue: per-repository adoption of the shared workflow lint and organization-wide Dependabot for GitHub Actions, both deferred.woksin commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Workflow-lint adoption rollout status:
.github/workflows/workflow-lint.yml(the reusable actionlint/zizmor caller) has been added through one smallno-releasepull request per repository.workflow-lint.ymladded to the allowed-workflows list in the repository verification.actions/cachemoved from v3 to v4 inpublish.yml, which the linter rejected.policy / verify, but the workflow reportsverify / verify. This mismatch was already there and blocks every pull request in that repository. It needs a protection or workflow fix by the owner.Org-wide Dependabot configuration stays deferred.