chore(deps): bump vm2 from 3.9.18 to 3.11.6 in /plugins/sfcc-headless

[dependabot]

Bumps vm2 from 3.9.18 to 3.11.6.

Release notes

Sourced from vm2's releases.

v3.11.6

Five advisories closed. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

What's Changed

Security fixes

• GHSA-cfcw-xp6x-25gj — Stacked-indirection bypass of the GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg apply-trap peel. Two layers of Function.prototype.{call,apply,bind} pushed the host prototype mutator out of the inspected position; a later variant ran the __proto__ setter entirely host-side, defeating both identity checks (RCE).
• GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9 — bufferAllocLimit bypass via Buffer.concat(list, totalLength) and Buffer.from(arrayLike), which reach the host allocator without traversing the sandbox-side wrapper — one call allocates past a configured cap (host memory-exhaustion DoS).
• GHSA-m283-3h24-438v — Host errors leaked live host references into sandbox catch blocks via Error.cause, the SuppressedError / AggregateError slots, arbitrary own properties (err.detail = process), and the carrier's prototype chain. Any embedder function throwing an error that carried a host reference was an escape (RCE).
• GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x — NodeVM builtin: ['*'] exposed os and dns, the last two process-wide builtins. Both leak host identity and network topology, and both write host state: dns.setServers() hijacks the host's DNS resolver, os.setPriority() renices the host process.
• GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3 — bufferAllocLimit bypass via ArrayBuffer, SharedArrayBuffer, every TypedArray constructor, and WebAssembly.Memory, which hit the same timeout-immune V8 allocator uncapped — a ~200-byte payload becomes gigabytes of host RSS (host memory-exhaustion DoS).

Upgrade Notes

• builtin: ['*'] users depending on os or dns — both are now denied, along with node:os, node:dns and dns/promises. Re-introduce a safe subset via require.mock / require.override.
• Finite bufferAllocLimit users — the cap now also covers Buffer.concat / from / copyBytesFrom and the ArrayBuffer / SharedArrayBuffer / TypedArray / WebAssembly.Memory constructors. The default Infinity is unaffected.
• Host errors now reach sandbox catch blocks as sandbox-realm errors. Primitive diagnostics are preserved and instanceof now works for subclasses; non-primitive properties and the host prototype chain are gone by design.

Full Changelog: patriksimek/vm2@v3.11.5...3.11.6

v3.11.5

What's Changed

Bug fixes

• #566 — Restore util.inspect output on Node 26+. console.log(vm.run(...)) was rendering as Proxy(Proxy({})) / Proxy(Proxy([])) instead of the underlying value. Triggered by Node 26's stricter handling of nested proxies in the inspector.
• #567 — Restore array iteration on vm.freeze()'d host arrays. Calling .map() / .filter() / .forEach() etc. inside the sandbox on a frozen host object containing arrays threw TypeError: 'isExtensible' on proxy: trap result does not reflect extensibility of proxy target. Regression from the 3.11.0 proxy-invariant hardening.
• #568 — Fix .node extension handler key in lib/resolver.js (the key was ' .node' with a leading space, so native addon resolution silently fell through to the default path). Thanks to @​cherr-cc.

Upgrade Notes

Drop-in replacement for 3.11.4. No API or configuration changes.

Full Changelog: patriksimek/vm2@v3.11.4...v3.11.5

v3.11.4

Ten advisories closed. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

What's Changed

Security fixes

• GHSA-c4cf-2hgv-2qv6 — Bridge set trap ignoring ECMA-262 §9.5.9 Receiver, letting Object.create(hostObj) children and Reflect.set(hostObj, k, v, custom) writes leak onto the host object (write-channel → RCE).
• GHSA-m5q2-4fm3-vfqp — Cross-realm Symbol.for namespace leak + missing dangerous-symbol guards on the bridge's write traps (set / defineProperty / deleteProperty), enabling sandbox-installed nodejs.util.promisify.custom / stream brand / webstream hooks on host objects (RCE).
• GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg — Host prototype mutation via Function.prototype.{call,apply,bind} and Reflect.{apply,construct} indirection through Object.prototype.__proto__ setter, severing host intrinsic prototype chains and escaping via thisEnsureThis proto-walk fallthrough (RCE).
• GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x — Defense Invariant #11 violation in defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace (second variant of GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq in a different file): sandbox-installed Array.prototype[N] setter / Array.prototype.join override could observe bridge-internal stack-trace state.
• GHSA-76w7-j9cq-rx2j — Promise species hijack in localPromise's swallow-tail, hijacking the downstream child constructor to capture V8's internal (resolve, reject) capability and reach a raw host-realm error → host Function (RCE).
• GHSA-m4wx-m65x-ghrr — NodeVM constructor patch bypass of GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx: any truthy nesting paired with a non-real-config require produced a NESTING_OVERRIDE-only resolver → inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require → child_process RCE.

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from vm2's changelog.

[3.11.6]

Five advisories closed. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

Security fixes

• GHSA-cfcw-xp6x-25gj — stacked-indirection bypass of the GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg apply-trap peel: the peel inspected one layer of Function.prototype.{call,apply,bind} indirection, so two layers slipped the host prototype mutator past it, and a follow-up variant laundered the severance entirely host-side. Closed at two independent chokepoints — lib/bridge.js refuses to deliver host prototype mutators, and both it and handleException reject any host object whose prototype chain reaches null without passing through the sandbox Object.prototype. See ATTACKS.md Category 37 and test/ghsa/GHSA-cfcw-xp6x-25gj/.
• GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9 — bufferAllocLimit (GHSA-6785-pvv7-mvg7) bypass via Buffer.concat(list, totalLength) and Buffer.from(arrayLike), whose host implementations reach the C++ allocator without traversing the sandbox-side allocUnsafe wrapper. lib/setup-sandbox.js now caps concat, from, and copyBytesFrom, and a fail-closed enumeration of host.Buffer's own keys turns any future uncapped allocator into an explicit error rather than a silent bypass. See ATTACKS.md Category 23 (extended) and test/ghsa/GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9/.
• GHSA-m283-3h24-438v — host errors leaked live host references into sandbox catch blocks through four channels: Error.cause, the SuppressedError / AggregateError sub-error slots, arbitrary own properties (err.detail = process), and — beyond the reach of own-key enumeration — the carrier's own prototype chain. handleException now seals the spec-defined slots and rebuilds every host-wrapped carrier as a fresh sandbox-realm error carrying only its primitive properties, discarding the host prototype chain entirely. See ATTACKS.md Category 38 and test/ghsa/GHSA-m283-3h24-438v/.
• GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x — sibling of GHSA-9g8x: NodeVM builtin: ['*'] still surfaced os and dns, the last two process-wide builtins. Beyond host-identity and network-topology reads, both carry writes reachable in one line of sandbox code — dns.setServers() hijacks the host's DNS resolver, os.setPriority() renices the host process. lib/builtin.js adds both to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS, covering node: spellings and dns/promises automatically. See ATTACKS.md Category 35 (extended) and test/ghsa/GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x/.
• GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3 — bufferAllocLimit bypass via ArrayBuffer / SharedArrayBuffer / TypedArray / WebAssembly.Memory, which reach the same synchronous, timeout-immune V8 backing-store allocator uncapped. When a finite limit is set, lib/setup-sandbox.js wraps each constructor with a construct trap capping the ToIndex-coerced byte count, and pins prototype.constructor so the uncapped intrinsic cannot be recovered by a constructor walk. The default Infinity leaves them untouched. See ATTACKS.md Category 36 and test/ghsa/GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3/.

Upgrade notes

• If you use NodeVM({ require: { builtin: ['*'] } }) and depend on os or dns, those two builtins are now denied (GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x), together with node:os, node:dns, and dns/promises. They join the process-wide class closed in 3.11.4: they expose host-process identity and network topology, and dns.setServers() / dns.setDefaultResultOrder() / os.setPriority() are outright writes to host-process state. Embedders needing a sandbox-local subset (typically os.platform(), os.EOL, os.constants) should register a controlled wrapper via require.mock or require.override.
• If you set a finite bufferAllocLimit, the cap now also covers Buffer.concat, Buffer.from, Buffer.copyBytesFrom, and the ArrayBuffer / SharedArrayBuffer / TypedArray / WebAssembly.Memory constructors (GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9, GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3). Sandbox code that previously allocated past the cap through those paths now gets the same RangeError. The default bufferAllocLimit: Infinity leaves every one of them untouched, so this is a no-op unless you opted into the cap.
• Errors thrown by embedder-exposed host functions now reach sandbox catch blocks as sandbox-realm errors rather than proxies of the host error (GHSA-m283-3h24-438v). Primitive diagnostics (message, name, stack, code, errno, syscall, path, …) are preserved and error subclasses (TypeError, RangeError, …) now satisfy instanceof correctly inside the sandbox; non-primitive properties, and anything reachable through the error's prototype chain, are gone by design.

[3.11.5]

Patch release — no API changes.

Fix

• #566 — util.inspect of vm.run(...) results rendered as Proxy(Proxy({})) on Node 26+. Install nodejs.util.inspect.custom on host-side proxy targets so the inspect output reflects the underlying shape.
• #567 — Array iteration methods on a vm.freeze()-d host array threw an 'isExtensible' on proxy invariant error (regression from the GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p species defense). Align the ReadOnly proxy target's extensibility with its trap result and skip species neutralization on the host→sandbox apply path.

[3.11.4]

Ten advisories closed. Patch release — no API changes for valid configurations.

Security fixes

• GHSA-c4cf-2hgv-2qv6 — bridge escape via BaseHandler.set ignoring the ECMA-262 §9.5.9 Receiver argument; Object.create(hostProxy).x = v and Reflect.set(hostProxy, k, v, sandboxObj) wrote through to the host object instead of installing on the receiver, turning every embedder-exposed host object into a sandbox write channel. Receiver-gated install-on-receiver fix in lib/bridge.js mirroring ReadOnlyHandler.set. See ATTACKS.md Category 32 and test/ghsa/GHSA-c4cf-2hgv-2qv6/.
• GHSA-m5q2-4fm3-vfqp — sandbox escape via unblocked cross-realm Symbol.for keys plus missing dangerous-symbol guards on the bridge's write traps. Two-layer structural fix: lib/setup-sandbox.js denies the entire nodejs. namespace at Symbol.for and aligns the read-side filters with the full 9-symbol cache, and lib/bridge.js extends isDangerousCrossRealmSymbol and applies it to the set/defineProperty/deleteProperty traps. See ATTACKS.md Category 8 / Category 20 (both extended) and test/ghsa/GHSA-m5q2-4fm3-vfqp/.
• GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg — host prototype mutation via apply-trap indirection. Sandbox code could reach host prototype-mutating setters (Object.prototype.__proto__, setPrototypeOf, defineProperty, __defineSetter__/__defineGetter__) through Function.prototype.{call,apply,bind} and Reflect.{apply,construct} indirection, sever a host intrinsic's prototype chain, and escape via the bridge's thisEnsureThis proto-walk fallthrough. Two-layer structural fix in lib/bridge.js (apply-trap blocklist + cache check before proto-walk). See ATTACKS.md Category 30 and test/ghsa/GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg/.
• GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x — Defense Invariant #11 hardening for defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace (second variant of GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq in a different file). The sandbox stack-trace formatter accumulated frames in a sandbox-realm array and .join-ed them, so a sandbox-installed setter on Array.prototype[N] (or .join override) observed bridge-internal state — no host reference reachable today, but one enrichment away from regressing into the GHSA-9qj6 RCE shape. Fixed in lib/setup-sandbox.js by folding frames through a primitive string accumulator (no Array.prototype slot reachable) and converting makeCallSiteGetters to localReflectDefineProperty for symmetry. See ATTACKS.md Category 28 Variant B and test/ghsa/GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x/.
• GHSA-76w7-j9cq-rx2j — Promise species hijack in the localPromise swallow tail. The swallow-tail apply(globalPromisePrototypeThen, this, [...]) call inside localPromise's constructor invoked the cached host Promise.prototype.then without first calling resetPromiseSpecies(this), so a sandbox subclass overriding [Symbol.species] could redirect the downstream child constructor to a user function and capture V8's internal (resolve, reject) capability — delivering a raw host-realm error (RangeError from deep recursion + e.stack) to a sandbox collector and reaching the host Function constructor via .constructor.constructor. One-line fix in lib/setup-sandbox.js adds the missing resetPromiseSpecies(this) before the swallow-tail call, matching the pattern already used by the .then/.catch/Reflect.apply overrides. See ATTACKS.md Category 31 and test/ghsa/GHSA-76w7-j9cq-rx2j/.
• GHSA-m4wx-m65x-ghrr — NodeVM constructor patch bypass of GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx: a truthy nesting paired with anything other than a real require config object produced a NESTING_OVERRIDE-only resolver → inner NodeVM with attacker-chosen require → child_process RCE. Structural fix in lib/nodevm.js: destructure first, then reject at construction whenever nesting is truthy and requireOpts is not a non-null object or Resolver. Supersedes GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx. See ATTACKS.md Category 25 and test/ghsa/GHSA-m4wx-m65x-ghrr/.
• GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q — sandbox escape via WebAssembly JSPI (Node 24 behind --experimental-wasm-jspi, Node 26+ default). WebAssembly.promising returns Promise objects whose [[Prototype]] chain points directly at the host realm's Promise.prototype with no bridge proxy in between, so p.finally() reaches host Promise.prototype.finally, V8's SpeciesConstructor reads an attacker-controlled p.constructor getter, and the eventual host-realm rejection is dispatched through the attacker's class with no bridge wrapping — e.constructor.constructor('return process')() then evaluates in the host realm. Structural fix in lib/setup-sandbox.js: delete WebAssembly.promising and WebAssembly.Suspending at sandbox bootstrap, mirroring the existing WebAssembly.JSTag removal. Adds Defense Invariant #12 (no sandbox-visible object may have a host-realm prototype chain without bridge interposition). See ATTACKS.md Category 33 and test/ghsa/GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q/.
• GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4 — NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via process and inspector/promises. The exact-match denylist in lib/builtin.js missed two host-passthrough families: process (whose getBuiltinModule(name) reloads any core module regardless of the embedder's allow/deny configuration) and inspector/promises (whose Session().post('Runtime.evaluate', ...) evaluates attacker JS in the host realm). Structural fix promotes the check to family-prefix via isDangerousBuiltin(key), strips the node: URL prefix, and adds process to the dangerous set — enforced at both BUILTIN_MODULES source and addDefaultBuiltin. Supersedes GHSA-947f-4v7f-x2v8. Adds Defense Invariant #13. See ATTACKS.md Category 21 (extended) and test/ghsa/GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4/.
• GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p — NodeVM builtin: ['*'] wildcard exposed Node's undocumented underscored network builtins (_http_client, _http_server, the _http_* / _tls_* / _stream_* siblings), letting sandbox code make outbound HTTP requests and open listening sockets even when the documented -http/-https/-net/-tls exclusions were used — SSRF-class capability bypass (CVSS 8.6). Structural fix in lib/builtin.js: BUILTIN_MODULES filter now excludes any name starting with _, so '*' expands only to documented public builtins; explicit opt-in, mock, and override paths remain functional. See ATTACKS.md Category 34 and test/ghsa/GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p/.
• GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f — NodeVM builtin allowlist surfaced four process-wide observability builtins (diagnostics_channel, async_hooks, perf_hooks, v8) that read state from the entire host process rather than the sandbox: HTTP IncomingMessage headers (incl. auth tokens) via diagnostics_channel.subscribe, embedder AsyncLocalStorage context via async_hooks.executionAsyncResource, embedder performance.mark labels via perf_hooks, and the full V8 heap via v8.getHeapSnapshot / v8.queryObjects. Fix in lib/builtin.js: extends DANGEROUS_BUILTINS with the four names, reusing the existing two-layer enforcement (BUILTIN_MODULES filter + addDefaultBuiltin rejection, family-prefix and node:-normalised via isDangerousBuiltin). mock/override escape hatches preserved. See ATTACKS.md Category 35 and test/ghsa/GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f/.

Upgrade notes

• If you constructed NodeVM({ nesting: <truthy> }) without an explicit require config object, new NodeVM(...) now throws (GHSA-m4wx-m65x-ghrr). This covers every shape that previously silently produced a vm2-only resolver: omitting require entirely, or setting it to any falsy value (false/undefined/null/0/'') or any truthy non-object value (true/number/string/symbol/function); and also any truthy nesting value, not only nesting: true (1/'yes'/{}/[]/function). Either drop nesting, or pass an explicit require config object (e.g. require: { builtin: [] }) to acknowledge that vm2 will be requireable from inside the sandbox. The error message is actionable and links to the README hardening section.

[3.11.3]

... (truncated)

Commits

• a5b31cd ci: pin the compilers job to TypeScript 6
• 3dffc8f test(GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3): raise the timeout on the documented-residual case
• a1cf31d chore(deps-dev): refresh lockfile, clearing all dev-dependency advisories
• b76dd7d chore: bump to 3.11.6 and cut the release section
• 7e3faaf fix(GHSA-m283-3h24-438v): sanitize host error carriers reaching the sandbox
• a85acb6 fix(GHSA-cfcw-xp6x-25gj): refuse host prototype mutators and severed host val...
• c950166 fix(GHSA-v836-6xw4-9cx3): cap ArrayBuffer/TypedArray/WebAssembly.Memory under...
• 3ffb315 fix(GHSA-gmc2-2x9w-cgh9): close bufferAllocLimit bypass via concat / from / c...
• 768bcfc fix(GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x): deny os and dns NodeVM builtins
• 5e0f255 feat: add maintainer skill governing the security advisory queue
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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