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boost::format %N$ positional: signed-int overflow chain (UB) #110

Description

@rcanzanese

We are filing this as hardening and not as a security advisory. This is one of two issues the Netskope Threat Labs team discovered and is reporting. They share no root cause with this report and can be triaged independently.

Technical details

Component boost/format/parsing.hpp:70-83,155-175,457-496
Upstream tested boostorg/format @ 3fb39d7 (develop HEAD)
Class CWE-190 signed-int-overflow (UB only; no MC on real targets)
Severity LOW — CVSS ~2.0
Reachability boost::format(attacker_format_string)

Root cause

Triple signed-int overflow on attacker digits. On 2's-complement: %2147483648$d -> n=INT_MIN -> argN_=INT_MAX -> num_args_=INT_MIN. Downstream guards prevent OOB; UBSan trap only.

Trigger

boost::format("%2147483648$d")

Upstream status

STILL PRESENT in boostorg/format develop HEAD and 1.85.0

Suggested fix

Same str2int() clamp as SRC-11 closes this. Additionally, validate argN_ < some_max before using it as an index.

Activity

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